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Response
Christine Chung
First, I would like to take the opportunity to thank Professor Michael 
Watts for, to put it simply, a great presentation. After first reading a 
sample of Dr. Watts’ work in my Geography Senior Seminar, coinci-
dentally with Professor Moseley, I did not expect I would find myself 
sitting next to him for the purpose—of all things—to critique his work 
at the 15th Macalester International Roundtable. Perhaps I should have 
paid more attention in class! Not only was I intimidated by this feat 
because of the great length of his essay (which I might add is rivaled 
only by his cv), but also because at that moment I knew very little 
about the subject at hand: Oil, Development, and the Politics of the Bottom 
Billion. And I will confess to you now, I still know very little. My pur-
pose in this article is not to tell Professor Watts where he went wrong 
or where he was out of line because I believe that after studying this 
subject for about thirty years, he probably knows what he is talking 
about. What I hope to bring to the table are my own questions that 
arose from the essay and my own perspective, as a Macalester student, 
as a budding Geography major, and as someone born and raised in the 
Global South, the developing world.
*****
It seems only appropriate to the theme of this year’s Roundtable that at 
the beginning of the year, the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban 
Ki-Moon, announced (unofficially) that 2008 was the “Year of the Bot-
tom Billion.”1 He stressed, and I reiterate here, the need to address the 
plight of the world’s poorest, who have been left behind by global eco-
nomic growth. Drawing on Paul Collier’s recent book, The Bottom Bil-
lion, there are fifty-eight countries that are trapped in the vicious cycle 
of poverty, their economies characterized by a lack of growth (mea-
sured in the most basic sense by GDP per capita). In addition, they are 
becoming increasingly marginalized from the global economy.2 The 
category of the “bottom billion” was not created overnight. Although 
countries can fall into at least one of the four traps described by Collier, 
the path of decline does not happen instantaneously. Have we not been 
standing aside and watching the slow deterioration of these countries, 
witnessing the repeated occurrence of coups and civil wars? Of course, 
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the plight of the bottom billion is much more complex than I have 
just described; but if the global community does not even respond on 
a timely basis to the slow onset of famine in Ethiopia or genocide in 
Sudan, then how does one expect it to do so for the countries lagging 
behind? Have these poor countries been left out of the loop of globalization or 
have they instead been the product of globalization—the very process of global 
integration that is both a cause and effect of development?
*****
In his essay for the Roundtable, Professor Watts has attempted to 
explore “the dynamics of oil-states, and specifically the relations 
between oil, politics, and forms of rule,” or governmentality. To accom-
plish this, he critically examined three claims: (1) the “rebellion as 
organized crime” claim; (2) the “territoriality/materiality” claim of 
oil; and (3) the “predation-insurgency” claim. In all three, oil is in 
some way being vested with specific qualities or, as Watts likes to say, 
“Olympian” properties, which are used to shape the means to political, 
economic, or individual ends. I would not consider these three claims 
to be mutually exclusive (is anything ever in Geography?), nor would 
I consider them to be necessarily interdependent. Does the “lootabil-
ity” of oil necessitate the occurrence of an insurgency, and does this 
insurgency then influence the type of political outcome, be it a coup or 
secession? Perhaps these ideas are impacting each other, but playing 
out at different scales of relations within what Watts calls the govern-
able spaces of the “oil complex.” The oil complex is Watts’ attempt to 
“lay out something of the structure of the political economic DNA as it 
operates through a particular economy of violence in the Niger Delta.”
Watts provides a critique through the deconstruction of existing 
theories and arguments that have been put forth to rationalize why 
oil disrupts the “normal course” of development. Scholars like Collier, 
Hoeffler, Le Billon, Obi, Ross, and Klare are just a few of the contribu-
tors to this burgeoning field of oil-centered studies. Watts also attempts 
to account for why oil, and to a larger extent, natural resources, are 
linked to a heightened risk of conflict and instability. Collier attributes 
it to the natural-resource trap and the conflict trap.3 Le Billon theorizes 
“the level of dependence, conflictuality and lootability of [oil] can also 
increase the vulnerability of societies to, and the risk of armed con-
flict.”4 Ross summarizes five aspects of the resource-conflict relation-
ship, three of which are relevant to oil: (1) natural resources increase 
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the likelihood of conflict, especially separatist movements; (2) lootable 
commodities lengthen the duration of existing conflict; and (3) there is 
no solid relationship between primary commodities (including oil) and 
the onset of civil war.5
Watts draws upon Collier’s argument, applying the natural-resource 
trap and the civil-war trap within the context of Nigeria, a place he 
has extensively studied for more than two decades. Through decon-
struction, Watts presents the oil complex as a means of explaining the 
nuanced relationship between oil and resource conflicts. This consists 
of all the actors involved in the oil economy, with oil at the center of the 
stage, interacting at multiple scales and placed within an overarching 
political economy whose power dynamics help to mediate the social 
relations of access and allocation. The oil complex is specific to each 
country; the actors may be similar across borders, but the socio-eco-
logical web of interactions is a function of the politics inherent in that 
geography.
Connected to these interactions within the oil complex are struggles, 
including specifically livelihood struggles. Academic scholar Obi con-
tends that the “contestations over oil in Nigeria operate at several 
complex and interrelated levels that revolve around its centrality to the 
country’s political economy.”6 At the nexus of this political economy 
are struggles for resource control and ownership, struggles for the 
recognition of ethnic minorities, and struggles for the sustenance of 
livelihoods, all of which are occurring simultaneously at the interface 
between global oil politics and national geo-strategic motives.
*****
One of the first things that struck me in Watts’ essay was the starting 
questions he poses to the reader, compelling me to critically question 
my own motives and challenge whatever preconceived notions of the 
subject at hand. I will pose these same questions to you now: Is Nigeria 
cursed by oil or corruption (or corporate capitalism); by petroleum or politics 
(or ethnicity)? After reading Professor Watts’ essay, what do you think 
the answers are? Are there any clear answers?
First, we assume that Nigeria is cursed, but cursed for whom? 
Cursed by whom or by what? In what ways does this curse manifest 
itself? The resource-curse theory is based on the notion that economies 
dependent on natural resources (in this case, oil) are more likely to 
experience armed conflict and political instability.7 Furthermore, the 
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abundant-resource wars hypothesis posits that resource endowment 
influences the type of political economy and governance in a country.8 
What this would mean in Nigeria is that the abundance of oil is linked 
to poor economic growth as well as poor governance, both of which are 
associated with a higher risk of conflict.9 Resource-cursed societies are 
characterized by slow economic growth, high poverty rates, endemic 
corruption, and authoritarian or militaristic governance.10 With 70% 
of the population living on less than $1 per day and with $600 billion 
in oil revenues since 1960 reported “missing,” one can say with confi-
dence that Nigeria has definitely been struck by the resource curse, or 
what Watts calls, a “nightmare.”
Yet this line of analysis directly falls into the trap of commodity 
or resource determinism. In other words, to contend that oil has the 
power to spark conflict or disrupt societal governance is to argue that 
economics trumps sociopolitical factors. Watts carefully notes that oil 
reflects a “complex set of forces and assumes an often Olympian power 
in contemporary life…a perfect expression of contemporary capital-
ism’s most basic genetic material.” We must understand that the physi-
cal endowment of oil causes neither conflict nor dependence. Instead, 
oil dependency is rooted in a historical process of resource extraction 
and exploitation of the environment for humankind’s needs.11 Remem-
ber that “resources are not; they become,”12 and what a resource becomes 
is connected on the most basic level to human needs and desires. If oil 
is not the agent of corruption, inequity and poverty in Nigeria, challenging 
resource-conflict theories, then we must ask ourselves what are the larger 
sociopolitical and economic processes hidden behind the slippery scapegoat of 
oil?
*****
We must remember that as politicized and fetishized oil may appear in 
our global capital economy, it is still a natural resource, the key word 
being “natural.” Oil is a part of the natural environment. The Olym-
pian powers, the high economic value and far-reaching influence that 
oil has been vested with, are all products of the social construction of 
oil as a commodity. Nevertheless, oil is derived from the environment, 
which makes the struggles outlined in Watts’ argument part of a larger 
ecological crisis or environmental conflict.
Political ecologist Paul Robbins defines the environmental-conflict 
thesis as follows: increasing deprivation produced through resource 
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enclosure or appropriation by state authorities, private/corporate inter-
ests, or social elites will accelerate conflict between groups.13 How does 
this thesis inform the resource control debate in Nigeria? First, the 
environmental-conflict thesis is based on the premise that social sys-
tems are structured around division of labor and power. The hierarchy 
of power leads to differential resource access and responsibility, on the 
basis of class, gender, and ethnicity. Robbins argues that any analysis 
of environmental conflict should require a careful consideration of 
the following questions: who controls the resource, who is allowed to 
decide about it, and who is expected to do which tasks? I will take it a 
step further and add: why does this group control the resource and how is 
ownership/control decided?
This leads us to the second premise related to ownership: that prop-
erty is a complex bundle of rights, dictating the rights to own, use, 
manage, control or derive income from use, and control capital value.14 
Often these bundles are not apolitical. They are influenced by the his-
torical experience of development. Furthermore, development tends to 
be based on certain preconceived notions that revolve around (again) 
class, gender, and race or ethnicity.15 In Nigeria, the oil lands in the 
Niger Delta could be considered to be the property of the ethnic com-
munities that have lived there for centuries, through the traditional rite 
of inheritance. Land tenure and property relationships have histori-
cally been conducted largely at the village or community level, varying 
by ethnic group; for example, property title is not an absolute right 
in the Hausa ethnic group, but rather a traditional claim transferred 
through family lines.16 In this sense, the land should be seen rather as 
collective property or community property. However, even if the local 
ethnic groups own the land, it is the right of the state to control oil-
based revenue allocation. If property rights and growth and development 
are supposed to be based within the public sphere, then what makes it in the 
private interests and motives of those in power, say the state, to implement 
public policies to secure them and the associated benefits? Privatization of 
rights has a tendency to lead to “resource conflicts, production losses, 
and increasing inequality.”17 Production in this sense does not amount 
solely to oil revenues, but also to the productivity of the land and labor, 
to the loss of diversification, and to the loss of livelihoods.
It becomes imperative to understand how each participant in the 
development process in Nigeria impacts the others through the modi-
fication and exploitation of the environment and the production of oil-
based systems. Encouraged by the skyrocketing oil prices of the 1970s, 
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the Nigerian government invested its resources in the oil industry, 
sacrificing the potential to develop the manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors, such as peanuts and cocoa. This created the underlying basis 
for conflicts and struggles as the ecological systems were altered to 
enhance oil production, and the benefits were geared towards a spe-
cific group, the ruling elites.
*****
The rise of civil society in Nigeria and the emergence of new social 
movements, in particular the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND), point to a new form of political action and help 
to demonstrate how local movements and interactions can modify or 
hinder global political and economic forces. An illustration is the 30% 
shut-in of production in the Niger Delta having negative reverbera-
tions throughout the global oil economy, with the rise in gas prices 
being the most relevant to the consumer.
What do the rebel insurgencies reflect about the condition of the state in 
Nigeria and the human condition within this oil economy? Struggles exist 
to expose underlying power differentials and it is only through oppo-
sition that the status quo is revealed.18 The rise of the civil society is 
“welcomed” with immediate state repression. Now embracing a new 
form of political action and the power along with it, civil society thus 
challenges the status quo. The relations between the actors of the oil 
complex have unveiled a lack of strong national identity among the 
Nigerian people, especially in the Niger Delta. It also exposes the weak 
state capacity, the distrust by the rulers of their own military, and hid-
den behind all, the twin hands of capitalism and neo-liberalism. The 
power dynamics between the actors in the oil complex are deeply 
rooted in historical tensions between ethnic minorities, the state and 
ruling powers, and the oil companies.
*****
Embedded in the social field of violence is the main actor, the rebel. In 
the last twenty years the Niger Delta has been plagued with a surge 
in violent activity, mainly on the part of numerous social movements 
and militant groups. For the local communities, which are under the 
dominant impression that these groups are standing up for their col-
lective interests and taking back what is rightfully theirs (oil bunkering 
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is not considered stealing, for example), there is an almost positive 
perception of these subterranean groups. It is significant to note the 
changing behaviors, practices, and morals of rebel groups in response 
to interactions with other groups, shifts in the distribution of oil rights 
and revenue, and continued military repression by the state. Watts 
advises us not to be naïve about the moral character of the rebels and 
their associated grievances.
Likewise, I caution Watts and others to not assume the “standard 
script” bestowed upon rebels by scholars in the discourse of develop-
ment, who view resource users as “monolithic.”19 This view does not 
account for political forms of exclusion and marginality on the basis 
of ethnicity, class, and gender. The fluidity of the actors within the oil 
complex is in response to the new or changing social and ecological 
categories and strategies, influenced by knowledge, context, and polit-
ical process.20 In this light, I call for Watts to delve further into the moral 
economy of the rebel and the insurgent group, and the specific adaptations 
that they make under (changing) conditions of conflict. Where do we draw the 
line between social movement and insurgency? Is violence the only defining 
characteristic? Why should social movements have to resort to violent means 
to reach their individual or collective ends?
*****
Under the principle of allocation, the development of one place, popu-
lation, or industry must occur at the expense of another. The natural 
resources of the world, including human beings, are limited in every 
respect, either by their mode of reproduction or regeneration, their 
source and supply, their ease of distribution, the governing political 
economic systems, or by the simple reality that something being used 
at a certain time and place is not available for use elsewhere. It then 
becomes a question of distribution and ownership: who determines what 
resource gets used where, when, and how?
Development is an act of translation; an act that is centered on the 
interactions between the subject and the power apparatus, and neither 
can exist without the other.21 Increasingly, the civil society in Nigeria 
has become more vocal and active (and even more violent in its means). 
These groups are shifting the power dynamics in their favor, but at the 
expense of disrupting the status quo of the state and maybe even the 
“natural course of development.” Watts fulfilled his intent to provide 
an account and possible explanation for the dynamics between oil and 
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politics in Nigeria. By doing so, he exposed the livelihood struggles of 
the people in the Niger Delta.
Where does this leave us now? First, Nigeria is no longer the num-
ber one producer of oil in Africa.22 Second, the violent attacks on the oil 
companies continue. In September 2008, for example, the MEND had 
declared war on the oil industry after a weeklong attack, and vowed to 
reduce Nigeria’s oil exports to “zero.”23 Third, Nigeria is currently in 
the process of drafting a strategic plan for the national vision of trans-
forming Nigeria into one of the twenty largest economies in the world 
by 2020, “able to consolidate its leadership role in Africa and estab-
lish itself as a significant player in the global economic and political 
arena.”24 The first two themes listed in the strategic plan are poverty 
alleviation and development issues, and secondly, revenue allocation. 
This definitely offers optimism for the country and its people, but 
before the state can even consider implementing this impressive plan, 
it must first address the plight of its own people and their struggles to 
reclaim their property (oil), reclaim their local autonomy, and reclaim 
their national identity.
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